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Technology appears to be making ﬁne-scale charging (as in tolls on roads that depend on
time of day or even on current and anticipated levels of congestion) increasingly feasible.
Such charging also appears to be increasingly desirable, as trafﬁc on roads continues to
grow and costs and public opposition limit new construction. Similar incentives towards
ﬁne-scale charging also appear to be operating in communications and other areas, such as
electricityusage.Standard economictheorysupportssuchmeasuresandtechnology isbeing
developed and deployed to implement them. But their spread is not very rapid and their
prospects for the future are uncertain. This paper presents a collection of sketches, ranging
from ancient history to very recent developments, that illustrate the costs that charging
imposes. Some of those costs are explicit (in terms of the monetary costs to users and the
costs of implementing the charging mechanisms). Others are implicit, such as the time or
the mental processing costs of users. These argue that the case for ﬁne-scale charging is
not unambiguous and that in many cases such charging may lead to undesirable outcomes.
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1. Introduction
Lewis L. Strauss, the Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission, is often
remembered for a famous claim, made in the optimistic early days of nuclear
power,
Our children will enjoy in their homes electrical energy too cheap to meter, .. It is not
too much to expect that our children will know of great periodic regional famines in the
world only as matters of history, will travel effortlessly over the seas and under them and
through the air with a minimum of danger and at great speeds, and will experience a
lifespan far longer than ours, as disease yields and man comes to understand what causes
him to age.
(Strauss 1954)
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2033 This journal is q 2008 The Royal SocietyStrauss’ expression ‘too cheap to meter’ has entered the lexicon as a
catchphrase for technological promises that have gone unfulﬁlled. Electricity
continues to be paid for roughly in proportion to usage. The cost of electricity
is not so low, nor the cost of metering it so high, that the purveyors of electric
power have chosen to forgo charging by use. The alternative, either ‘free’ service
or a ﬁxed price for unlimited (unmetered) use, has not come to pass in the
electricity sector. Just the opposite appears to be happening. ‘Smart meters’ that
charge different prices, either depending on time of day or, in even more
sophisticated versions, depending on the level of electricity consumption in the
system, are already deployed in industry and are becoming more widespread in
residential use. In spite of continuing substantial progress in the electric power
generation technology, overall costs are, if anything, increasing as fuel prices rise,
and there is intense public opposition to building more power plants and
transmission systems, as well as concerns about pollution, climate change, fuel
depletion, etc. Hence, attention is paid to methods that either reduce electricity
consumption or at least shift it away from periods of high loads (as running
clothes dryers at night does). Improved sensor, computing and communication
technologies make it possible to implement sophisticated schemes that were
unthinkable until recently, and which promise to optimize various criteria as
determined by economic models.
Similar attempts to implement ﬁne-scale charging are apparent in other areas.
This paper explores the history of the cost of charging for the use of several
different transportation and communication services, and its consequences. It is
not a comprehensive survey, but it does provide information that is not easily
accessible in any single source. The emphasis is on the explicit costs of the
charging mechanism (which are often surprisingly high, even in modern
electronic toll collection (ETC) systems) as well as on the implicit costs imposed
on users (such as their time or mental processing costs). We ﬁnd that pricing
often leads to counter-intuitive results.
There is a trade-off between the beneﬁts of metering (charging per use) and
its costs. The beneﬁts depend upon the cost structure of the underlying
transportation and communication technology, while the costs depend on the
cost structure of the revenue collection technology and on the burden it imposes
on users.
Individual transportation and communication technologies differ. Trans-
portation, especially the road sector, is wrought with substantial negative
externalities, most notably congestion. It is politically difﬁcult, monetarily
expensive and time-consuming to add capacity. Communication tends to be at
the other end of the spectrum, with costs of increasing capacity often low and
generally not objectionable to the public (with some exceptions, such as
opposition to cellphone towers). Furthermore, in many cases, service providers
have strong incentives to increase usage.
This paper begins with an extremely brief overview of relevant economic
theory. Then, several vignettes are presented which describe the experience
with pricing of different technologies (turnpikes and toll roads, the London
Underground and the Internet).
A discussion and conclusion tie the various sections together, suggesting a
broader and non-ideological consideration of ﬁnancing network infrastructure
that depends upon the underlying technology.
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(a) Fixed and variable costs
The total cost of production generally includes a ﬁxed cost and variable costs.
The ﬁxed cost of a road to serve one car is the same as that to serve 100 cars. The
variable cost differs, particularly if congestion sets in. Combining the declining
average (or per user) ﬁxed cost component and the rising variable cost
component gives a U-shaped curve.
The cost of collecting revenue to pay for the road has a similarly U-shaped
function. A revenue collection infrastructure has both ﬁxed and variable costs.
Each technology of revenue collection will vary in the relative share of ﬁxed and
variable components. Some technologies will have a higher ﬁxed cost and lower
variable costs, others the reverse. Furthermore, some will be able to be spatially
and temporally speciﬁc, while others only suitable for relatively crude
identiﬁcation of use in space or time.
(b) Price discrimination
The standard conclusion of conventional economics when applied to physical
goods has been that the maximal beneﬁt is obtained when price equals marginal
cost. But that does not work well when marginal costs decrease with volume
(the l.h.s. of the U-shaped cost curve). This happens frequently with information
goods, and also with many communication technologies and uncongested
transportation facilities. In these situations, marginal cost pricing does not
recover costs and sellers have strong incentives to price discriminate, namely to
charge prices that differ across different customers, depending on those
customers’ willingness and ability to pay. Odlyzko (2004) presents many
examples from postal services, canals, lighthouses and other industries, where
price discrimination played an important role. It was common for tolls on canals
or river navigation projects to vary dramatically depending on the nature of
the cargo.
A major reason for this discussion of price discrimination is that it is often the
main reason behind pricing and architectural decisions taken by service
providers. However, this is often carefully concealed and denied even when
obvious. While price discrimination, enabled by the exploitation of monopoly
power, is in many ways the Holy Grail of commerce, as it leads to maximal proﬁt,
it is a practice that arouses strong opposition (see Odlyzko 2003b). It was price
discrimination by railways that brought the ﬁrst serious federal regulation of
commerce in the USA. Moreover, historically, differential pricing has almost
always been controlled in transportation and communication. Such control is at
the root of common carriage, with its prohibition on ‘undue’ or ‘unreasonable’
price discrimination.
(c) Flat-rate preferences and stimulation of usage
Popular resistance to price discrimination has often been reﬂected in
legislative and regulatory constraints on the practice. But consumer resistance
to such practices, as well as to ﬁne-scale charging in general, also arises in more
market-oriented ways. One of them is through a marked preference for ﬂat rates.
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Although there have been numerous cases of this phenomenon over the ages,
they tended to be regarded as irrational aberrations.
A collection of historical examples of the preference for ﬂat rates is presented
in A. Odlyzko (2000, unpublished manuscript, http://www.dtc.umn.edu/w
odlyzko/doc/history.communications0.pdf) and Odlyzko (2001). In particular,
references given therein discuss the results of careful studies carried out at AT&T
in the 1970s. Three main reasons for the ﬂat-rate preference were identiﬁed there.
The ﬁrst reason was the insurance effect (even if usage is low now, it might spike
up as a result of some unforeseen circumstance), the second one was a systematic
overestimate of usage (which made ﬂat rates appear more economical than they
were) and the third one was a harder to characterize hassle factor. Nick Szabo (see
Odlyzko 2001)coined the nice term ‘mental transaction costs’ for this third factor,
people’s unwillingness to be bothered with ﬁne-grained pricing.
It should be noted that ﬂat rates can be shown to be advantageous to sellers
under some conditions even in the conventional economic model, where
preferences for ﬂat rates among customers do not exist. They are a form of
bundling, and so provide a way to take advantage of uneven preferences for
various pieces or transactions among users (see Fishburn et al. 1997).
While there is a growing literature on the preference for ﬂat rates, there is yet
another factor that is very important, but has not been studied systematically.
That is the strong impetus that ﬂat rates tend to give to usage. A collection of
vignettes is presented in A. Odlyzko (2000, unpublished manuscript) and Odlyzko
(2001), which show that it is very common for people, when their pricing plan
changes from a metered to a ﬂat-rate one, to increase their usage by between 50
and 200%. In many situations, this is of course undesirable. But in many others,
service providers do have incentives to increase usage. This is very common in
communications and occurs even in transportation, as we will see later.
3. Turnpikes and toll roads
(a) Traditional turnpikes
The word ‘turnpike’ comes from the technology used to enforce excludability, a
pike laid across the road which would not be lifted until the traveller paid his or
her toll. In England, turnpikes were developed in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. They helped make the British inland transport system
among the best in Europe, whereas before it had been regarded as extremely
backwards. For a historical perspective, see Jackman (1916) and Pawson (1977).
For recent studies that show with modern quantitative methods that turnpikes
advanced the British economy, see Bogart (2005).
English turnpikes were a response to the conﬂict between the growing needs
for better transport of a developing although still pre-industrial economy and the
inadequacy of the traditional system that forced local inhabitants to devote
several days per year to uncompensated labour on roads. Turnpikes were an
improvement, but not a very satisfactory one. There were a variety of concerns
(such as about making the King’s highway no longer open to all, and barring
the poor) which led to concessions such as the use of ostensibly non-proﬁt
trusts to operate the turnpikes, and allowing pedestrians and certain users free
D. Levinson and A. Odlyzko 2036
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A (2008)passage. Still, there were repeated riots (including the famous Rebecca riots in
Wales in the early 1840s) and constant complaints about inefﬁciency and fraud.
As just one example, Adam Smith (1776, book V, ch. I), while a supporter of
improved transport, had vocal complaints about turnpikes. Smith’s main concern
appeared to be about inefﬁciency. Jackman (1916) discusses this inefﬁciency and
the frequent abuses, such as inﬂated payrolls and outright evasion or theft of
tolls. The statute books of the period were full of sanctions and prescriptions. For
example, toll collection was often let for a ﬁxed annual fee (through prescribed
auction processes, which, however, were often subverted through collusion). This
was supposed to avoid the fraud practised by toll collectors, but of course only
moved the enforcement issue into the private sector, where the winning bidder
had the same issue of making sure that proper payment was delivered. In the
end, turnpikes were phased out in the second half of the nineteenth century and
replaced by open public roads. For us, it is worth noting that many of the
complaints about turnpikes were about the non-monetary costs to travellers
(such as the delays and inconvenience of toll collection). It was also quite
common for travellers to negotiate ﬂat-rate annual contracts (Jackman 1916).
It is understandable that the old turnpikes were expensive to operate. Even
disregardingfraudandinefﬁciency,theneedtostaffmanytollcollectionstationswas
boundtoproducehighcollection costs. What is amusingis that many ofthemodern
ETC systems, which supposedly beneﬁt from modern technologies, are also very
expensive,evenwhenoneconsidersjusttheexplicitcoststobuildandoperatethem.
(b) Toll collection technology
ETC systems are now common on many toll roads, made possible by a variety
of automatic vehicle identiﬁcation technologies. On toll roads, ETC increases toll
lane capacity, thereby reducing toll processing time and queue lengths at
toll plazas. Thus, both delays and the number of toll takers are reduced. The
most advanced open-road ETC can identify vehicles at full speed, reducing
vehicle delay due to toll collection to zero, from a time of 10–15 s associated with
paying at a tollbooth, and eliminating the concomitant queueing when demand
exceeds the available capacity of manual tollbooths. Furthermore, by reducing
delays, ETC increases throughput per lane, from 350 to 400 vehicles per lane
through a toll lane with manual collection up to 2200 vehicles per lane.
Prior to the advent of ETC, turnpikes in New York and Pennsylvania lost
between 14 and 19% of revenue collected to collection costs using the then-
current (labour-intensive) technology (Gittings 1987). This compares with 9.31%
found on California’s bridges, with the highest efﬁciency on the most heavily
travelled Bay Bridge between San Francisco and Oakland. When tolls doubled
on California bridges in 1998, the cost of collection relative to revenues collected
was halved (aside from additional delays due to the need to give change). Hence,
there is no reason to expect these percentages to remain stable as tolls vary.
Even with the adoption of ETC on conventional toll roads, when those roads
remain embedded in a network of untolled free roads, many users will not adopt
ETC. Finkelstein (2007) notes an equilibrium market saturation of approximately
60%. As a consequence, manual toll collection still has environmental consequences
associated with deceleration and acceleration and remains economically less
efﬁcient than other means of collecting revenue (Peters & Kramer 2003, 2005).
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tollbooths, money handling and roadway maintenance by 43.1, 9.6 and 14.4%,
respectively. Mitretek Systems (1999) for the Oklahoma turnpike system reports
that the annual cost to operate an automated lane in the Oklahoma turnpike
system is only $15 800 while the annual cost to operate an attended lane
is $176 000.
ETC has led to a modest resurgence in the use of tolling as a ﬁnance
mechanism, increasing from 5.1% of total revenue in 1995 to 5.7% in 2005
(Federal Highway Administration 1995, 2005). The number of toll roads
currently being planned in the USA comprises 656 km costing an estimated
$6.7 billion (Federal Highway Administration 2006). This is a signiﬁcant
number, but pales in contrast to the 40 000 km of the largely fuel tax-ﬁnanced
interstate highway already built. While some suggest a tipping point in the
construction of new toll roads (Orski 2006), it is important to note that a number
of roads were disturnpiked over this period, for instance tolls were removed from
the Kentucky Turnpike system. Furthermore, as pointed out by Finkelstein
(2007), the reduction in the salience of the electronically collected toll allows
agencies to increase tolls beyond what they may have been able to do were the
out-of-pocket charge felt directly.
One of the advantages of electronic tolling is the ability to impose dynamic or
variable tolls, which change by time of day or level of congestion, but, as of 2006,
only 29 facilities worldwide had done so (Burris 2007). This suggests that the
prime motivator for moving towards electronic tolls is the reduction in
transaction costs for the producer, and perhaps the ability to raise tolls with
fewer complaints, rather than with improved system management.
A few places have seen congestion charging imposed primarily for trafﬁc (or
environmental) management, rather than as a way to pay for the bonds ﬂoated
for the construction or to enrich investors. Notably, congestion charges have
been imposed in Singapore (McCarthy & Tay 1993), London and Stockholm
(Armelius & Hultkrantz 2006), which after a six-month trial in 2006 was then
approved by voters in the city (though rejected by those in the suburbs) and
implemented by the government. One of the key criticisms of the London scheme
has been its high collection costs. The London congestion charge, which now
charges the vehicle owner £8 per day to travel in the centre of London, before the
recent toll increase (from £5) had enforcement and collection costs of
approximately 67% of operating revenue (Hensher 2003), which compares with
a less than 1% collection cost loss associated with fuel taxes (Wachs 2003).
Prud’homme & Bocarejo (2005) conducted a thorough, though controversial,
analysis arguing that while the scheme may be a political and technical success,
it is an economic failure owing to its high toll collection costs. The authors
estimate the revenue collected from tolls as 2.5 times as large as the beneﬁts.
Mackie (2005), critiquing their study, notes their ﬁndings as ironic, since the
main fear about implementing congestion pricing was that it would be an
economic success but political failure. It might further be noted that, since the
introduction of the congestion charge, parking revenue in central London
dropped (due to the reduced demand; Arup & Partners 2004). The same revenue
might possibly have been raised much less expensively (and much of the same
effect achieved) through the relatively efﬁcient means of taxing parking revenue
and charging for parking spaces, though that would not capture through trafﬁc.
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lanes to high-occupancy/toll (or HOT) lanes, allowing non-carpool trafﬁc to buy
into the excess capacity of the carpool lanes. In the USA, this has occurred at ﬁve
locations, one of them in Minneapolis on I-394. While again generally heralded as a
success, the MnPass HOT Lanes in the Twin Cities did not recover system
operating costs after more than a year in operation (Metropolitan Council 2006),
though this was promised to happen shortly. It appears probable that they will
never recover capital costs of investing in the additional infrastructure required to
implementthesystem.Whetherthecongestionreductionbeneﬁts,orthegainsfrom
sorting drivers who have different values of time or values of reliability, outweigh
those capital costs is not yet known.
The question arises as to why tolls would be preferred to taxes to pay for the
construction and maintenance of roads, given their high collection costs,
especially when congestion pricing of some sort is not the prime motivator.
A number of reasons have been given, though Levinson (2002) poses this as a
question of the ability to tax-export. Without excludability, roads may be used
by both the local and through trafﬁc. If the through trafﬁc comprises a signiﬁcant
portion of the total trafﬁc, the economic free-riding problem is quite severe.
This has several consequences. The incentives for locals to pay for the road
are diminished, and there is a welfare loss associated with underprovision of
infrastructure. There is also overconsumption of local roads by non-residents who
are not charged for their use. Underprovision and overconsumption naturally
lead to poor quality. This poor quality of roads was seen prior to the imposition
of turnpikes in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England.
By contrast, with tolls placed at borders, locals can ofﬂoad a disproportionate
share of road costs on non-residents, tax-exporting in a sense, and meeting what
might be dubbed the Monty Python test for an ideal tax: ‘taxing foreigners living
abroad’ (Chapman et al. 1989). Levinson (2001) shows that states in the USA
with more non-resident travel (typically smaller states in the northeast part of
the USA) are more reliant on tolls than larger states with a higher proportion
of local trafﬁc.
4. Public transport in London
Shillibeer’s omnibus, started in 1829, was the ﬁrst regular bus transportation in
central London. It charged fares of one shilling, quite expensive for that day.
The Central Line, opening in 1900, advertised itself as ‘The Twopenny Tube’
in recognition of its ﬂat fare (in contrast to the convoluted fare structures
present on other railway lines and still present on surface railway systems in
England today).
Paying fares for transit was historically quite common, in large part because
these public transport systems were private, for-proﬁt enterprises. The costs
of collection were not insigniﬁcant. The job of the conductors was to collect
and enforce fares, though their presence may have had other positive effects
on passenger behaviour and aided in the maintenance of capital. On a vehicle
like a bus or an electric tram, the presence of a conductor, who in 1900
was paid 4 shillings and sixpence daily, almost as much as a driver’s 5
shillings per day (Harley 2002), could nearly double labour costs. Labour was a
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trams, which had higher capital costs but could in principle carry more passengers
per driver.
On the Underground, costs associated with ticket-taking were signiﬁcant. For
instance, the 1926 report of London’s Hammersmith and City Line had ‘Ticket
Collectors, Policeman, and Porters, &c’ as costing £12 045 out of £29 333 of
trafﬁc expenses and compared with £85 637 of passenger receipts (Hammersmith
and City Railway Joint Committee 1927, unpublished data).
As noted previously, if we believe that there are increasing marginal costs
associated with use, charging fares will appropriately match demand with supply.
This is the case, for example, with congested buses in peak periods. However, if we
are on the l.h.s. of the U-shaped cost curve, charging fares still discourages demand,
but as there are no added marginal costs with the extra passenger, this reduces
total welfare. Many transit systems in the early twenty-ﬁrst century are in this
situation, at least some of the time. In response, many agencies sell ‘season passes’
under various guises (e.g. university ‘U-passes’, allowing students and faculty
unlimited access to a transit system for a reduced fee) to encourage use. Since the
pass has a one-time cost, the marginal cost for travel from the perspective of
the traveller who has purchased one is zero, making the traveller more inclined
to use the system. From the point of view of the operator, this increases certainty in
the revenue stream, provides access to capital in advance and increases usage,
while reducing the number of required transactions and thus transaction costs.
From a societal point of view, this may reduce car ownership (Axhausen et al.
2001). Season tickets in Zurich increased bus passenger trips by 4.5%, while in
other Swiss cities the increase was as large as 16% (FitzRoy & Smith 1999).
Possessing a season pass that allows unlimited rides increases usage, as the
marginal cost of use once in possession of a pass drops. London has seen a major
increaseinpublictransportusageoverall,withseasonticketusagegrowingfasterthan
ordinary payment. Between 1995 and 2005, bus ridership in London increased 40%
(National Audit Ofﬁce and the Audit Commission 2005). The Travelcard, allowing
integrated daily (or weekly) use of all public transport in London, was introduced in
1981. London Transport claimed that the introduction of the Travelcard resulted in
an increase in underground passenger-miles of 33% over the course of the decade
between 1982 and 1991 (Prat 2003), though there were other conﬂating factors.
Many newer light railway systems (and a number of older tram systems, such
as in Zurich) do not aim to check every passenger boarding to ensure payment,
and instead couple an honour system with random enforcement. It is an empirical
and site-speciﬁc question as to whether that trade-off is worthwhile. A system
with fare machines at the entrance and exit, such as the London Underground,
with fewer than 300 inspectors for 2.5 million daily passengers, attains fare
evasion rates of the order of 2%. By contrast, light railway systems without
enforcement estimate evasion rates that range from 1.7% in Salt Lake City to
4.7% in Denver (which has 10 inspectors and 60 000 daily trips; Leib 2007).
1
1Lowered collection costs is one reason to rely on the honour system with enforcement and a
second reason might be faster boarding times. If, as is typical with a bus, each passenger pays on
boarding a light railway vehicle, the boarding time with payment is much higher. Alternative
station arrangements could resolve this to some degree, which would then require more space at
the station to establish a prepay and post-pay zone.
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transit in their city centres. Other cities have made transit free city-wide,
eliminating transaction and enforcement costs entirely and paying for the system
as a public service out of parking fees or general revenue.
5. Telecommunications and the Internet
Many of the telecommunication technologies undergoing development and
deployment (such as IP Multimedia Subsystem and Next Generation Network)
appear to be motivated largely by the desire for ﬁne-scaled charging. On the
other hand, overall ﬂat-rate plans appear to be spreading (see the comments
about voice services in the papers and presentations at ITU Workshop on The
Future of Voice 2007, for example).
The history of telecommunications, starting with the postal system, presents
a variety of examples of the importance of pricing. It also shows how
conventional approaches often lead decision makers astray and often continue
to do so century after century. The famous British Penny Post reform of 1840 is
a very instructive example. It removed the distance sensitivity in pricing (which
was motivated by price discrimination considerations and was not based on
costs) and instead introduced a simple one-penny price anywhere in the UK. This
led not only to a dramatic increase in usage, but also initiated a trend of a steady
and relatively rapid growth in postal communication, in place of stagnant
demand that had been experienced before. This is described in A. Odlyzko (2000,
unpublished manuscript).
A very instructive example in considering pricing of telecommunications
services is the transition in the 1880–1920 period from ﬂat rates to metered rates
for local telephone calls. This change occurred essentially everywhere around the
world, with the singular exception of the USA. The motivation for such a move
came from the general perception of decision makers in the phone industry, and
from a variety of careful studies, which unanimously concluded that ﬂat rates
were bound to be ruinous for phone companies and unjust to users, with low-
volume users subsidizing the heavy users. And indeed, with the technology of
that time, where an operator was involved in setting up all calls, the marginal
costs were high, so the conventional economic argument for metered rates
seemed irrefutable and was not refuted. However, in the USA, this argument did
not prevail, apparently owing to the competition between AT&T and the
independent phone companies (see A. Odlyzko 2000, unpublished manuscript).
Instead, consumer preference for ﬂat rates led to residential pricing remaining
ﬂat rate in most of the country. In addition, contrary to the conventional
economic argument, the revenues of the US phone industry as a fraction of GDP
tended to be higher than those in other countries and usage, as measured in
minutes per day per line, was far larger.
The Internet, which is subsuming the rest of the telecom industry, started out
as a research network with no mechanism for charging individual users built in.
When individual users started getting connected to it in large numbers in the
early to mid-1990s, they mostly did so through commercial dial-up online
services such as AOL or CompuServe, which had metered rates. Of these, AOL
was the largest and most prominent, and it was a watershed for the Internet
2041 Too expensive to meter
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A (2008)when, in the autumn of 1996, AOL moved to ﬂat rates. Since local calls in the
USA were mostly ﬂat rate, this meant that Internet access as a whole became
ﬂat rate in the USA. The AOL move was precipitated by the introduction of
ﬂat-rate Internet access by AT&T’s WorldNet division.
2 AOL managers feared
what ﬂat rates would do to their network, and indeed it did get clogged, as
the per-subscriber time online tripled over the following year (see the graphs in
A. Odlyzko (2000, unpublished manuscript) and Odlyzko (2001)). But with time,
those same managers came to appreciate the advantages of having closer
contacts with customers and started to boast in their quarterly ﬁnancial reports
of how much usage had increased.
3 Interestingly enough, AT&T WorldNet
managers were not aware of the studies on the effect of ﬂat rates and were
basically looking for features attractive to their customers.
The growth of the Internet was accelerated by the switch of ﬁrst AT&T and
then AOL and then the rest of the industry to ﬂat rates. This was actually a
very visible and widely discussed move. Another change, also very important,
took place soon afterwards, but has received practically no attention at all. It
concerned wireless voice usage.
Voice telephony is unjustly neglected in policy considerations, as decision
makers worldwide are preoccupied with wireline data and especially the Internet.
Yet there are over twice as many wireless voice users as there are Internet users
in the world today, and their spending is far more than twice as large as the
spending on Internet access. (For general information on the role of both wireless
and wireline voice, which still provides approximately 80% of telecom revenues,
see the papers from ITU Workshop on The Future of Voice 2007.) Much of the
recent rapid economic growth that is credited to the Internet may instead be due
to the spread of wireless voice.
In wireless (cellphone) communication, the USA is widely regarded as a laggard,
with several incompatible systems and handsets several years behind world
leaders. But that misses a very important point. The USA is the unchallenged
world champion in wireless usage. This has been one of the most remarkable, and
almost totally unknown, phenomena in communications over the last decade.
Unfortunately, unlike with wireline voice, where the International Tele-
communication Union (ITU) has traditionally collected detailed usage statistics,
we do not have a comprehensive database of how much time people in different
countries spend on their wireless voice phones. Still, around most of the world,
it appears that usage is of the order of 3–5 min d
K1 per subscriber. The
big exception is the USA, where current (early 2007) usage seems to be
approximately 25 min d
K1. Table 1 shows the history of wireless voice usage
in the USA, based on data kindly supplied by the CTIA (and available in
cruder form from the graphs in CTIA (2006)). The USA attained its leadership
position in wireless voice usage not because of any conscious policy decision
by government bodies, or by the industry, but by accident. As is discussed in
2Some smaller Internet service providers had offered ﬂat rates earlier, but they were not a serious
factor in the market, and so it was only the AT&T move that forced AOL to respond.
3Interestingly, AT&T WorldNet customers did not increase their usage much when moving to ﬂat
rates, as they were interested in other activities than AOL subscribers (see Evslin 2005) and simply
ended up paying extra money for the freedom from mental transaction costs that metered rates
inﬂicted.
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the introduction of the AT&T Digital One-Rate plan in the spring of 1998, which
offered a block of time for a ﬂat monthly rate, with no long distance or roaming
charges. It was introduced by AT&T Wireless with very modest expectations,
created in ignorance of the history ofﬂat rates within AT&T and elsewhere in the
telecom industry. But it turned out to be so popular that the rest of the industry
had to follow, with the dramatic effects visible in table 1. (As of this writing, in
early 2007, there are several service providers that offer truly ﬂat-rate wireless
voice service, instead of the block pricing plans that are dominant.)
Unfortunately,voiceisregardedasirrelevantandhardlyanyonepaysattentionto
it.Yetitisstillthedominantrevenuesourceforthetelecommunicationindustryand
plays a key role in human interactions. One can of course ask whether encouraging
morevoiceusageisgood.Butthenweshouldalsoaskwhetherencouragingmoredata
usage is good! And a simple response is that the increased usage visible in table 1
representspeopledoingwhatcomesnaturallytothemwhentheyarenotencumbered
by worries about per-minute billing, an evolution of phone service away from
charging for each connection and towards providing a connectivity service.
From the standpoint of service providers, increased voice usage in the USA has
not resulted in any disaster. The widely watched average revenues per subscriber
have held up at least as well, if not better, than in Europe (see the US data in
CTIA (2006)), and the industry is very healthy.
4 This mirrors what happened
with wireline voice, where the statistics in A. Odlyzko (2000, unpublished
manuscript) show that unlimited local calling in the USA was associated with a
generally higher fraction of GDP devoted to telephony than in other countries.
An important point about the numbers given in table 1 is that they show more
than just a quick income effect. Even if one takes into account that block pricing
plans did not take over right away, what happened is not that users started
calling more once they were on the new plans, but rather that they gradually
increased their time online. The same phenomenon occurred with the Penny Post
reform in 1840 and similar reforms later in other countries. Stagnant volumes
were replaced by vigorous growth.
In addition to the conventional economic arguments, sophisticated charging
s c h e m e sg i v em a n a g e r so fs e r v i c ep r o v i d e r st h ec o m f o r t i n gf e e l i n gt h a tt h e yc a n
use them. (The technical term for this phenomenon is ‘real options’, and they
Table 1. US cellphone usage, minutes per day per subscriber around June of each year.
year usage (min d
K1)
1994 4.2
1996 3.9
1998 3.9
2000 7.3
2002 13.2
2004 18.1
2006 23.0
4Increased cellphone usage may have resulted in more trafﬁc crashes. Eby & Vivoda (2006) review
the literature, and cellphones are blamed for 1.5–5% of distraction-related crashes.
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network effects, lock-in and related issues.) This happened with the various
voice prioritization options in PBXs or the many fancy features in ATM
switches, which were essentially never used, but were required in procurement
documents. Thus, we may very well see a proliferation of complicated control
and charging mechanisms in the systems that are installed, even if they are not
used in practice.
6. Discussion and conclusions
The cost of misclassifying a good with a high ﬁxed cost and funding it on a per-
use basis are several. First, there is underconsumption; by charging more than
the marginal cost, society is losing welfare that could be obtained by allowing
users who impose little or no burden on others from using the system. Managing
this process is not easy, as undercharging may lead to overconsumption, and
requires dynamic monitoring of the situation and the use of the network
technology. Second, there is underproduction, when the signal to build a more
comprehensive network is suppressed by overcharging. This may be especially
troublesome if there exist positive network externalities.
The vignettes presented in this paper suggest that the relatively neglected
transaction costs (experienced by both operators and users) may be the tail
wagging the dog. Reducing these costs for consumers through bundled services
(season passes, etc.) greatly increases use. Reducing the mental transaction costs
through ETC (which makes the thinking about payment similar to that for a
bundled good, even if every use is still charged for) reduces the salience of the
charge and gives operators signiﬁcant pricing power. Trying to recover costs in
networked industries can be quite expensive, even with modern technologies.
The lesson for cases such as the London congestion charge is that when the
aim is less to collect revenues and more to discourage usage, making the charges
more intrusive is likely to be desirable. There should be no monthly passes or
other easy payment methods. Requiring some positive action (involving heavy
mental transaction costs) from the user, such as having to send an email or SMS
message to the toll agency ahead of time, may discourage use as much as the
magnitude of the toll itself.
There is no single answer that applies at all times, charging per use versus
bundling depends very much on the context, the cost structure of the technology,
its demand and the costs of collection for users and suppliers.
But it should be kept in mind that very often simple charging or no charging
may be the ideal policy. It is not that the technology is so inexpensive that we
can just give it away, that it is too cheap to meter in the words of Strauss.
Rather, it is the cost of collecting charges on each transaction, both in real terms
for the operator and the user and in dissuading total demand by increasing
marginal costs, that makes it ‘too expensive to meter’.
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